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THE SCARLETT LETTER "T": THE TIER III TERRORIST
CLASSIFICATION'S INCONSISTENT AND INEFFECTUAL
EFFECTS ON ASYLUM RELIEF FOR MEMBERS AND
SUPPORTERS OF PRO-DEMOCRATIC GROUPS
I. INTRODUCTION

In Cameroon, Sara! was a peaceful political activist involved in
the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), a non-violent
organization seeking the independence of the English-speaking
regions from the French-speaking regions of Cameroon? Due to civil
unrest that ravaged her home country, 3 Sara escaped to the United
States, applied for asylum, and received the U.S. government's
protection from persecution. 4 Since her children were still in danger
in Cameroon, Sara petitioned for her children to join her. 5 However,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) unexpectedly
determined that the SCNC was a Tier III terrorist organization 6 and
placed their applications on hold. 7 During the lengthy and troubling
waiting period, one of Sara's children died from illness. 8

1.

2.

The name is added for specificity. Denial and Delay: Real Life Stories, HUMAN
RIGHTS
FIRST,
http://www.humanrightsfirst. orglwp-contentiuploads/pd£'RPPDenialandDelay-refugee-stories-ll1009-web.pdf (last visited May 31, 2012)
[hereinafter Denial and Delay: Real Life Stories]; see also Homeland Security Flags
Cameroonian Group in Terrorist Category, AFRICAN METRO NEWS (Sept. 15, 2011),
http://africanmetronews.coml?p=375 [hereinafter Homeland Security Flags].
Cameroon: The Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and the Southern
Cameroons Youth League (SCYL); Organizational Structures; Leaders; Activities;
Membership Cards; Treatment of Their Members by Government Authorities,
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN. (Apr. 2, 2008), available at http://www.
unhcr.orglrefworldldocidl4829b55cc.html.
Id.
Denial and Delay: Real Life Stories, supra note 1.

3.
4.
5.
6.

ld.
Homeland Security Flags, supra note 1. The SCNC has consistently brought their

7.
8.

cause for independence before the Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization,
whose members included minorities and unrecognized territories joined together to
find non-violent solutions to conflicts. IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE BD. OF CAN, supra
note 2.
Denial and Delay: Real Life Stories, supra note 1.
Id.
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Sara's story echoes other real-life stories of hundreds of prodemocratic asylum seekers who seek protection from persecution. 9
But these "freedom fighters"IO and their supporters are barred from
receiving safe harbor by § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) of the Immigratiem and
Nationality Act, commonly known as the Tier III bar. ll Under Tier
III, members of pro-democratic groups who have fought against
totalitarian regimes and who have fought within U.S. campaigns, like
the U.S and Iraqi operation against Saddam Hussein's regime, are
classified as terrorists. 12 The Tier III bar also denies asylum to those
who have supported such groups, such as interpreters or
messengers. 13 These bizarre results contradict Congress's purpose in
establishing Tier III: to enforce stricter post-September 11, 2001
(9/11) security measures and bar from asylum individuals who pose
genuine threats to the United States. 14 However, Tier III is
overcompensating. 15
This comment examines how the current Tier III terrorism bar
inconsistently and ineffectually denies asylum to members and
supporters of pro-democratic groups by branding them as
''undesignated terrorists." 16 Part II discusses how the Tier III
classification and its consequent effect on the material support bar
undermine the United States' historic commitment to asylum. 17 Part
III evaluates how Tier Ill's overbroad classification results in
inconsistent and ineffectual application of asylum law to members
and supporters of pro-democratic groups. 18 Part IV proposes that,
rather than using the Tier III classification to impose a blind and
sweeping bar to asylum, Congress should amend the bar to include a
reasonable nexus between terrorist acts, their purposes, and their

9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.

Karen DeYoung, u.s. to Stop Green Card Denials for Dissidents, WASH. POST, Mar.
27,
2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/articie/2008/03126/
AR2008032603281.html.
Id.
Id.
See id. (discussing how many Iraqi and Vietnamese are barred from asylum because
they fought and materially supported U.S. forces during the Vietnam and Iraq Wars).
See Felicia Cardona, Saddam Hussein Foe in Immigration Limbo in Denver, DENVER
POST, Aug. 19,2009, at B1, http://www.denverpost.comltechnology/ci_13154773.
See REAL ID Act of2005, H.R. 418, 109th Congo (2005); infra Parts III.B-N.A.
See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Freedom Fighter or Terrorist? The u.s. Can't Decide About
Bangladeshi Immigrant Sachin Karmakar, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 12, 2008,
http://www.villagevoice.coml2008-11-12/news/freedom-fighter-or-terrorist-the-uscan-t-decide-about-bangladeshi-sachin-karmakar/.
See infra Parts II.B, III.A.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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targets. 19
I argue that this nexus should be realized in an
individualized, multi-factor test based in domestic and international
law. 20 The proposed amendment to Tier III bar will draw a clearer
line between individuals who are actual threats to national security
and those who are genuine victims of persecution. 21
II.

THE TIER III CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENT
EFFECT ON THE MATERIAL SUPPORT BAR UNDERMINE
THE UNITED STATES' INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
TO ASYLUM UNDER THE REFUGEE CONVENTIONS

A.

The United States' Commitment to Protecting the Persecuted

Consistent with the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees 22 (the Refugee Convention), the United States
"has long held to the principle that it will not return a foreign national
to a country where his life or freedom would be threatened. ,,23 Yet
Tier III classification endangers this principle by labeling persecuted
pro-democratic groups and those who support them as terrorists. 24 To
understand how the Tier III defmition does not fulfill the aim of
protection, a brief discussion of the statutory history of asylum in the
United States via the Refugee Act and the Tier III material support
statutory defmitions is necessary.
1. The Refugee Act of 1980
With the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the United States
became what some call "the first universal nation. ,,25 The Act created
a legal remedy by which foreign nationals could find protection from
persecution by adopting the Refugee Convention's definition of

19.
20.
2l.
22.

23.

24.
25.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part IV.B.
As of 2008, the United States has acceded to but not ratified the Protocol of 1967. See
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Protocol of
1967 Relating to the Status of Refugees 7, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT'L LAW
(2008), http://untreaty.un.org)cod/avllhalprsr/prsr.html.
RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., RL 32621, U.S. iMMIGRATION POLICY
ON ASYLUM SEEKERS I (2005).
See Dwoskin, supra note 15, at 2.
Doris Meissner, Thirty Years of the Refugee Act of 1980, AMERICA.GOV (Sept. 21,
2010), http://www.america.gov/st/peopleplaceenglishl2010/SeptembeI20100921144
657aidanO.8100397.html.
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asylum. 26 The Refugee Act became the emblem of the United States'
commitment to international relief for persecuted individuals around
the world. 27 As a result, more than three million individuals have
been able to fmd protection and resettlement in the United States
since 1980. 28
The United States' commitment to asylum, however, did not
extend to those who threatened U.S. security. 29 These exclusionary
provisions of asylum were based in the Refugee Convention. 30 The
Refugee Convention provided that a state must refuse asylum to an
individual in two instances: (1) if there are reasonable grounds to
consider an individual a "danger to the security of the country"; and
(2) if the individual has been "convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, [and] constitutes a danger to the
community of that country.,,3l Similarly, the Refugee Act bars from
asylum those whom the United States has reasonable grounds to
consider as a danger to national security. 32
2.

Asylum Procedure, Benefits, and Exclusions

The United States' commitment to asylum is incorporated in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which contains the legal
basis for asylum in Section 101(a)(42)(A).33 To apply for asylum, a
person must be "unable to return to [his or her] country because of
a ... 'well-founded fear of persecution' based on race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social
group or political opinion.,,34 To seek asylum, a foreign national

26.

27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.

Id. See Refugee Act of 1980, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102
(1980). This definition is the basis for U.S. asylum in the U.S. hnmigration and
Nationality Act. See hnmigration and Nationality Act §§ 101(a)(42)(A),
208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.c. §§ 1101 (a)(42(A), 1158(b)(l)(B)(i) (2006) [hereinafter
INA]; infra Part 1I.A.2.
See Meissner, supra note 25.
Id. at 8.
See Refugee Act of 1980, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 201(e), § 243(h), 94 Stat.
102 (1980).
See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 22, at 4.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 28,1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Convention of Status of Refugees]. Ratification of the
Convention by 144 countries makes the treaty one of the principal treaties in
immigration law. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, States Party to the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol (Apr. 1,2011),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b73bOd63.html.
See Refugee Act of 1980 sec. 201(e), § 243(h).
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
Id.
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must be outside his or her country of nationality. 35 According to
Section lOl(a)(42)(A) and Section 208(a)(2)(A), to be eligible for
asylum, a foreign national must be ''unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of ... that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. ,,36
Receiving asylum in the United States provides an individual
protection from persecution and an opportunity to rebuild his or her
life in a new country.37 A person who receives asylum can apply for
work authorization, petition for his or her spouse and children to
come to the United States, apply for lawful permanent residence one
year after being granted asylum, and apply for U.S. citizenship five
years after acquiring lawful permanent residence. 38 However, as
discussed below, these benefits are not available to those statutorily
excluded from asylum, even if they otherwise meet the legal basis. 39
These benefits provide a small glimpse of how precious an
opportunity asylum is to individuals fleeing from threats to their lives
and freedom.

B.

The Tier III Terrorist Bar to Asylum

Though an individual's life may be in dire danger if he or she
returns home, and though he or she may have an eligible legal basis
for asylum, participation in certain kinds of ambiguous activities
labeled as "terrorist" activities will bar such an individual from
asylum. 40 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)41 contains a three-tier structure for

35.
36.

37.

38.

39.
40.
4l.

Id. §§ 10 1(42)(A), 208(a)(2)(A). For individuals with no nationality, the law requires
that they must be outside of the country they last habitually resided. Id.
Id. § 101 (a)(42)(A).
See Asylum, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.
uscis.gov/portalisite/uscis (follow "Refugees & Asylum" hyperlink; then follow
"Asylum" hyperlink) (last updated Sept. 7, 2011).
Id.
See infra Part n.B.
INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.c. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).
The current statutory definitions of terrorist organizations and terrorist activities were
added to the INA by the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26,2001 and
the passage of the REAL ill Act in 2005. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 411,115 Stat. 272, 345-48 (2001) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006»;
Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, tit. I, § 103, 119 Stat. 302, 306-09
(2005) (codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1182).
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categorizing terrorist activities. 42 Tier I includes groups found by the
Secretary of State to be foreign organizations that engage in terrorism
that threatens U.S. national security;43 Tier II encompasses groups
publicly designated in the Federal Register as terrorist
organizations;44 and the Tier III classification is reserved for
''unnamed'' groups that are not designated as terrorist organizations
but who meet certain criteria. 45
According to the INA, the Tier III classification includes any
"group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which
engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in" any activity listed as
a terrorist activity in the INA. 46
Rather than authorizing a
government agency or providing clearer statutory criteria to
determine which groups qualify as Tier III organizations, Congress
has allowed DRS adjudicators and immigration judges to "make
these determinations on an ad hoc basis.,,47 The following three
sections briefly discuss each part of the Tier III terrorist bar and the
corresponding material support bar, as well as their consequences for
eligible asylees who erroneously fall under their overbroad
classifications.
1. Defmition of a "Terrorist Activity"
The INA list of what constitutes a "terrorist activity" is not meant
to be exhaustive. 48 Rather, it includes certain activities that Congress

42.

43.
44.

45.

46.
47.

48.

INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)-(III), 8 U.S.c. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)-(III); Kathryn
White, Chance for Redemption: Revising the "Persecutor Bar" and "Material
Support Bar" in the Case of Child Soldiers, 43 VAND. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 191, 204--D5
(2010) (discussing the three tiers of terrorism bars to asylum and their pmctical
consequences ).
INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I), 219(a)(l)(A)-(C), 8 U.S.c. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I),
1189(a)(l)(A)-(C).
Id. §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)-(II), 8 U.S.c. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(I)-(II). Tier II
organizations are "groups that are 'otherwise designated' by the Department of State,
upon publication in the Federal Register, as a terrorist organization, after a finding
that the organization engages in certain terronst activities defined under the INA."
"Material Support" and Related Bars to Refugee Protection: Summary of Key
Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, UNHCR (Dec. 15,2006), http://
www.rcusa.orgluploads/pdfs/rns-summ-unhcrkeyprov12-06.pdf.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(IlI); see also White, supra
note 42, at 204-05 (discussing the three tiers of terrorism bars to asylum and their
practical consequences).
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (2010), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(IlI).
White, supra note 42, at 205-D6.
See Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 780, 786 (9th Cir. 2009); McAllister v. Att'y Gen.
of the United States, 444 F.3d 178, 187 (3d Cir. 2006).
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considered indicative of terrorism. 49 The activities primarily must be
"unlawful under the laws of the place where [they] [are]
committed. ,,50 Most of the enumerated activities are clear terrorist
actions: "hijacking or sabotag[ingJ" of aircrafts or vehicles; 51
kidnapping or threatening to physically harm a person in order to
coerce a governmental entity "to do and abstain from doing any
act;"52 violently attacking an "internationally protected person";53
assassination;54 or threatening, attempting, or conspiring to commit
any of these acts.55
While most of these provisions constitute activities that violate
foreign domestic laws, section V is a notable distinction in the list.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V) provides that a terrorist activity may also
involve:
(V) The use of any(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon
or device, or
(b) explosive, fIrearm or other weapon ordangerous
device (other than for merepersonal monetary gain),
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safetyof
one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to
property. 56
Section V produces the most inconsistent and ineffectual
designations of "terrorists" because the classifIcation leads to
illogical results. 57 In In re Ma San Kywe, the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Agency frankly admitted to a local
immigration court that U.S. forces meet the required elements of a
Tier III organization because they used weapons that violated the
49.

50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.

INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 u.s.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
Jd.
Jd. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).
Jd. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II), 8 US.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
Jd. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(III), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(III).
Jd. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(IV).
Jd. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(VI), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(VI).
Jd. at § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) (V), 8 US.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V).
in
Won Kidane, The Terrorism Exception to Asylum: Managing the Uncertainty
Status Determination, 41 U MICH. lL. REFORM 669, 690-91 (2008); see also
GEORGETOWN LAW CTR. HUMAN RIGHTS INST., Unintended Consequences: Refugee
Victims of the War on Terror 1, 12 n.84 (2006), reprinted in 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 759
[hereinafter Unintended Consequences].
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laws of Saddam Hussein's regime and caused damage to property and
injury to persons. 58
2.

The Defmition of "Engaging" in Terrorist Activities

The meaning of "engaging" in terrorist activities has its own legal
definition. 59 Engaging in terrorist activities includes:
I.

II.
III.

commit[ ting] or... inc it [ing] to commit, under
circumstances indicating an intention to cause death
or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
prepar[ing] or ... plan[ning] a terrorist activity;
[and]
gather[ ing] information on potential targets for
•
.•
60
terronst actIvIty....

The statute also provides that a person who solicits funds "or other
things of value for a terrorist activity" or for a Tier I, II, or III
organization also engages in a terrorist activity. 61 Finally, an
individual engages in a terrorist activity if he solicits any person to
engage in conduct described in § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) or if he solicits any
individual to become a member in a Tier I, II, or III terrorist
organization. 62
In practical terms, the defmition of engaging encompasses any
kind of direct or indirect involvement in a terrorist activity
enumerated in Section 212(a)(3)(B)(iii).63 Ifan individual is involved
in a terrorist activity as defmed by INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), the
individual meets the defmition of "engaging in a terrorist activity.,,64
The only provision in the list that involves a fmding of intent is
section I, which requires a nexus between "circumstances indicating

58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

63.

64.

Kidane, supra note 57, at 690-91 (citing Unintended Consequences, supra note 57, at
12 n.84).
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
Id.
Jd. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV). The exception is if the
person can show by clear and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should
not reasonably have known, that the group was a terrorist organization. Id.
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc).
Jd. § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(V). The exception is identical
to the one provided for in Part IV.A-B. See supra note 61.
See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States: Transporting Best Practices, 33 FORDHAM lNT'L L.J.
300, 320 (2010) (explaining the practical effects of "engaging" in terrorist activities
under the INA).
INA §§ 212 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(1)-(IV), 8 U.S.c. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(1)-(V).
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an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury" and the terrorist
activity. 65 However, section I fails to explain how to detennine
whether a nexus exists. 66 Instead, the INA only requires government
agencies to reasonably show that any circumstances may indicate the
intention. 67
3.

"Material Support" of Pro-Democratic Organizations

The Tier III classification not only impacts the asylum eligibility
of pro-democracy groups engaged in armed conflict, but it also
affects the asylum eligibility of those who "materially support" prodemocracy groups erroneously branded as Tier III terrorist groups. 68
Under the material support bar, a person is ineligible for asylum if
he or she commits an act that he or she "knows, or reasonably should
know, affords material support... to a terrorist organization. ,,69
"Terrorist organizations" include those groups labeled as Tier III
terrorist groups. 70 This standard is disturbingly expansive. An
individual who "commits an act that he reasonably should have
known-but did not know-would afford material support to a
terrorist organization [is] barred from asylum.,,7} Acts considered as
material support are also needlessly expansive.72 "Material support"
includes providing "a safe house, transportation, communications,
funds, transfer of funds or other material fmancial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons... explosives, or
training.,,73 DHS and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) have
interpreted this provision as "not exhaustive,,74 and to include any

65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.
74.

Jd. §§ 212 (a)(3)(B)(iv)(I), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(I).
Id.
See Id. §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II), (iv)(I), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II), (iv)(I).
See Jennie Pasquarella, Victims of Terror Stopped at the Gate to Safety: The Impact of
the "Material Support to Terrorism" Bar on Refugees, 13 HUM. RTS. BRIEF, no. 3,
Spring 2006, at 28,29.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(cc).
See Pasquarella, supra note 68, at 28.
White, supra note 42, at 203 (citing Theodore Roethke, American Law and the
Problem of Coerced Provision of Support to a Terrorist Organization as Grounds for
Removal, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 173, 177-78 (2007) (describing
additional effects of the material support bar)). Additionally, a person may be
ineligible for asylum if he performs an act that he does not know is classified as a
terrorist act and does so for a group that he does not know, though he reasonably
should have known, is associated with terrorism. Id.
See id. at 203-204.
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), 8 U.S.c. §1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
Singh-Kaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293,298 (3d Cir. 2004).
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support, "no matter how small.,,75 As a result, '''if a person gave even
a glass of water' to a member of an armed group, that act would
qualify as material support.,,76
An individual who unfortunately falls into the material support
class has the burden of proving "by clear and convincing evidence
that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known,
that the organization was a terrorist organization.,,77 This high
threshold of proof is difficult to overcome. 78
III. INCONSISTENT AND INEFFECTUAL FUNCTIONS OF THE
TIER III CLASSIFICATION
At first blush, the goal of the Tier III classification system seems
to be to protect the United States from terrorist activities, no matter
how big or small. 79 However, the Tier III terrorist classification
serves more as a band-aid, rather than a solution, to the problem of
guarding against terrorism while furthering the United States'
commitment to international human relief 80 This section first shows
how the Tier Ill's classification impedes a consistent and effectual
application of asylum law to terrorists and U.S. allies. Secondly, this
section argues for a clearer defmition of terrorism for Tier III based
in international law.

A.

Tier III's Problematic Effects in Case Law: Matter ofS-K-

Although it is a case primarily involving the material-support-to-aterrorist-organization bar, the Board of Immigration Appeals'
decision in Matter of S-K- 81 is a clear signal for the need to statutorily
amend the Tier III classification in order to administer asylum law
effectively. 82 The case illustrates how applying Tier III contradicts
the purposes of asylum and safeguarding national security. 83
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

80.
81.
82.

Unintended Consequences, supra note 57, at 801.
Id. at 801 (quoting Interview with Walter Sanchez, Resettlement Officer, UNHCREcuador, in Quito, Ecuador (Mar. 2006».
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd), 8 U.S.c. § I I 82(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)(dd).
See White, supra note 42, at 206 (citing Gregory F. Laufer, Note, Admission Denied:
In Support of a Duress Exception to the Immigration and Nationality Act's "Material
Support for Terrorism" Provision, 20 GEO.lMM1GR. L.J. 437, 442, 459 (2006».
See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III), 8 U.S.c. §1l82(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (stating Tier III
classification encompasses "groups of two or more individuals, whether organized or
not, which engages in" a broad range of acts).
See DeYoung, supra note 9.
See S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 936 (B.IA 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 475 (B.IA 2008).
See S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 948-50 (Osuna, J., concurring) (discussing the
implications of the overly broad statutory language regarding "terrorist activity" in
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Matter of S-K- involved a Burmese Christian woman who was part
of the Chin minority population in Burma. 84 S-K faced persecution
and torture in Burma that would result from the Burmese military
dictatorship's constant human rights abuses against religious and
ethnic minorities. 85 S-K- had provided goods and money to the Chin
National Front (CNF), an organization seeking independence from,
and using explosives and arms in self-defense against, the Burmese
dictatorship. 86 CNF was also "allied with the National League of
Democracy, which the United States has recognized as a legitimate
representative of the Burmese people and is recognized by the United
Nations. ,,87
While fmding that S-K- met the legal requirements of asylum and
despite fmding her account of persecution credible, the immigration
judge determined that S-K- was barred from asylum because she
provided money and goods to an alleged terrorist group.88 CNF was
deemed an undesignated Tier III terrorist organization because it used
explosives and arms to endanger others and cause substantial
property damage-even though it used such weapons in selfdefense. 89 As a result, the judge barred S-K- from asylum.90 The
paradoxical import of this decision is best said by the immigration
judge in S-K-: "[O]ur own history is based on an armed response to a
government that we could not change democratically. ,,91
When S-K- appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals in 2005, a similar concern echoed the BIA's stalwart
decision upholding the Immigration Judge's decision.92 In his
concurring opinion, Board Member Osuna frankly stated that it is
doubtful whether CNF is a terrorist organization under the common

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.

§ 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA, 8 u.s.c. § 1182 (a)(3)(B) (2006), which can lead to
finding individuals ineligible for asylum based on actions that are actually consistent
with United States foreign policy).
See infra notes 84-103 and accompanying text.
S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 937.
Id. The Burmese government had also arrested and detained the respondent's brother
and fiance; her fiance was later killed by the military. Jd
Id. at 937-39.
Jd at 939; see also id. at 947-50 (Osuna, 1., concurring).
!d. at 937 (majority opinion).
Id. at 937, 939.
Id. at 937.
Denial and Delay: The Impact of the Immigration Law's "Terrorism Bars" on Asylum
Seekers and Refugees in the United States, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 3 (Nov. 2009),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.orglwp-content/uploads/pd£,RPP-DenialandDelayFULL-ll1009-web.pdf
See S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 937-39.
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defmition of the term. 93 Neither was CNF likely a Tier III
organization according to the DHS, which had reported that there was
no evidence CNF was involved in systematic acts of terrorism. 94
Indeed, Board Member Osuna noted that the INA's defmition of
what constitutes a terrorist is "breathtaking in its scope. ,,95 Tier III
labels any group who uses fIrearms for any purpose other than
personal monetary enrichment as a terrorist group. 96 This defmition
includes the U.S.-supported Afghan Northern Alliance that fought
against the Taliban, domestic violence disputes, and even juveniles
who discharge a gun and damage abandoned property. 97 The
overbroad scope of the statute is inconsistent with what Congress
intended the terrorism bars to protect against: actual threats to
national security. 98
Nonetheless, the BIA ultimately found that Tier Ill's current
classifIcation of terrorist organizations includes "even those people
described as 'freedom fIghters,' and [Congress] did not intend to give
[the immigration courts] discretion to create exceptions for members
of organizations to which our Government might be sympathetic.,,99
Despite evidence showing that the CNF was not a terrorist group and
that the arms it used were for self-defense, the BIA was bound by the
Tier III statute to classify the CNF as a terrorist organization. 100
Consequentially, those like S-K-, who "material[ly] support" such
organizations, are also barred from receiving asylum. 101 This is true
even when the undesignated terrorist group aided U.S. war efforts in
the past. 102
This illogical result did not escape the notice of the Attorney
General, who, in a March 2007 opinion, remanded In re S-K- to the
BIA for reconsideration following the DHS Secretary's determination

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Jd. at 948 (Osuna, 1., concurring).
Jd.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 947 (Osuna, 1., concurring).

Moreover, members of Congress, who
supported the addition of the Tier III bar in the INA via the USA PATRIOT Act and
the REAL ill Act, have said as such. See H.R. 5918, 109th Congo (2006), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkglBILLS-1 09hr5918ihlpdflBILLS-1 09hr5918ih.pdf
("[There are] unintended consequences of [the] overbroad bars on admission [by
asylum].").
S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 941.
Jd. at 947-48 (Osuna, 1., concurring).

99.
100.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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that supporting CNF does not bar an individual from asylum;
essentially, CNF was not a terrorist organization. 103
How effective for asylum seekers was the federal government's
response to its own department's evidence that CNF was not a
terrorist organization?
The answer is lost in an overtaxed
administrative process: the DHS is currently reviewing over 7,500
asylum cases involving organizations like CNF, and those cases are
placed on indefinite hold based on actual or perceived issues of
terrorism-related provisions. 104

B.

Possible Solutions for a More Precise Classification: Khan v.
Holder

Like In re S-K-, Khan v. Holder, a case decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, involved a foreign
national who provided what DHS claimed was material support to a
terrorist organization. lOS Unlike S-K-, the court in Khan proposed
some changes to the Tier III defmition to accomplish both goals of
ensuring national security and protecting the persecuted, including
incorporating international law to improve the definition of a Tier III
.
terrorist organization. I06
Since the 1970s, Khan worked with, but was never an actual
member of, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) , a group
with both militant and political factions that sought an independent
Kashmir. \07 Khan testified that he worked only with the nonviolent
political faction of JKLF.I08 However, Khan was barred from asylum
because he had been a member of a group that had a militant
subgroup engaged in terrorist activities. 109
The court rejected Khan's argument that actions considered illegal
in the foreign national's country are only "unlawful" within the
meaning of 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) list of terrorist activities if the actions
vio late the international law 0 f armed conflict. I\0 Khan's argument
103. S-K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 289-90.
104. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 91, at l. A majority of these cases have been
on hold for several years. Id
105. Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2009).
106. !d. at 786-87 (Nelson, 1., concurring).
107. Jd. at 775-76 (majority opinion).
108. Id. at 776.
109. Jd. at 777-78; see INA § 212(a)(3)(8)(iii), 8 U.S.c. § 1182 (a)(3)(8)(iii) (2006).
110. Khan, 584 F.3d at 78l. INA § 212(a)(3)(8)(iii) includes as terrorist activities acts that
are "unlawful under the laws of the place where [they are] committed (or which, if
[they] had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of
the United States or any State)." The problematic issue of armed conflict and the use
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echoes Board Member Osuna's opinion in In re S-K-, which
predicted the paradoxical results of branding those who use arms in
self-defense as terrorists under Tier 111.111 The court conceded this
point, although it rejected its relevance since the INA does not
currently allow for such an interpretation. 112
The court's opinion hints at a possible solution to current Tier III
classifications. 113 A more effective Tier III defmition would result if
the statute included a definition of terrorist "armed conflict" as being
illegal under international law standards.,114
The majority's hints in Khan at changing the Tier III classification
to a more useful and precise statutory bar are developed in Judge
Nelson's concurring opinion. ll5 Judge Nelson notes that Tier III may
become more useful if it incorporated certain aspects of international
law, such as including how intentional targeting of noncombatants
violates international law.1l6 Refming the Tier III classification to
distinguish those who target noncombatants from those who engage
in and support armed conflict would create a more effective bar to
asylum for genuine terrorists. 117
The majority and the concurring opinions' suggestions help set a
basis for redefming Tier III to exclude those engaged in selfdefensive armed conflict. ll8 In both Khan and In re S-K-, the courts
strongly emphasized the inconsistent and ineffectual structure of Tier
III and recommended a change based in international law. 119
Moreover, in both cases, the courts admitted that the INA's statutory
authority unfortunately trumps any kind of reasonable hesitations
courts have to apply the Tier III bar. 120 These irrational consequences
call for a statutory amendment.

of arms in self-defense is discussed in this comment's proposed multi-factor test. See
infra Pa;-t IV.A-B.
111. See S-K-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 936, 946-49 (B.IA 2006) (Osuna, J., concurring), aff'd in
part, vacated in part, 24 1. & N. Dec. 475 (B.IA 2008).
112. Khan, 584 F.3d at 781-82.
113. See id. at 781.
114. Jd. at 786-87 (Nelson, 1., concurring);see infra Part IV.A.2 for the intemationallaw
standards of terrorist armed conflict.
115. See id. at 781 (majority opinion); id. at 786-87 (Nelson, 1., concurring).
116. Id. at 786-87 (Nelson, 1., concurring).

117.
118.
119.

See id.
See id. at 781 (majority opinion); id. at 786-87 (Nelson, 1., concurring).
See id. at 781-82 (majority opinion); see also S-K-, 231. & N. Dec. 936, 941 (2006),
ajJ'd in part, vacated in part, 24 I. & N. Dec. 475 (B.IA 2008); S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec.
at 947-50 (Osuna, 1., concurring).

120. See Khan, 584 F.3d at 787-88 (Nelson, 1., concurring); S-K-, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 94041; S-K-, id. at 947 (Osuna, 1., concurring).
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IV. REDEFINING THE TIER III CLASSIFICATION

A.

The Need to Base the Undesignated Terrorist Classification in
Domestic and International Laws

The essential problem with the current Tier III defmition is that it
focuses on the smoking ~n rather than on who pulled the trigger,
against whom, and why. 1 1 The problem of defming terrorism is by
no means new, nor is it an easy problem to solve, primarily because
there is no international defmition of terrorism. 122 As a result, each
government has passed its own domestic laws and procedures. 123
However, if the United States is to follow the bipartisan 9/11
committee's warning to be "safer, stronger, and wiser" 124 in
combating terrorism, and at the same time adhere to its international
commitment of providing protection for the persecuted,125 Congress
must refme the Tier III defmition.
1.

The United States' Approach to Defming Terrorism

To create a clearer defmition of what constitutes an undesignated
terrorist, and thus highlight the difference between a genuine asylee
and a national security threat, it is necessary to evaluate U.S.
defmitions of terrorism. 126 The U.S. State Department defmes
terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated vio~ence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents," usually intended to influence an audience. 127 The United
States Code also defmes actions "intended to intimidate a civilian
population" or "to influence the policy of a government by
intimidation or coercion; or to affect the policy of a government
by ... assassination or kidnapping" as terrorism. 128 Taking these two
authorities together, the United States describes terrorism as a

121.
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.
128.

See S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 948 (Osuna, 1., concurring).
See Kidane, supra note 63, at 316.
Id.
NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REpORT: FINAL REpORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, at xvi (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMM'N REpORT].
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (citing Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31,1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol]).
See Kidane, supra note 63, at 370-71.
22 U.S.c. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006).
18 U.s.c. § 2331 (I)(B)(i)-(iii) (2006).
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strategic device intentionally used to further a political agenda by
intimidating civilians. 129
The U.S. court system, as seen in the Ninth Circuit's majority and
concurring opinions in Khan v. Holder, has also interpreted domestic
law defmitions of terrorism by comparing them to defmitions of
terrorism in international law. 130 Judge Nelson's concurring opinion
notes that the Geneva Conventions outlaw deliberate targeting of
noncombatants. 131 Consequentially, defining armed conflict that
violates international law as a terrorist activity creates a more precise
classification consistent with twenty- first century terrorist
strategies. \32 Additionally, Judge Nelson observed that Tier III has
adverse effects on U.S. policy because the Tier III bar discourages
groups sympathetic to similar U.S. campaigns from aiding U.S.
forces in the future. \33
The decision in Khan and other domestic legal defmitions of
terrorism help set a basis for redefining Tier III to exclude those
engaged in self-defensive armed conflict. 134 These domestic legal
contexts of terrorism can further benefit from international law
sources of terrorism, as discussed below. 135
2.

International Law's Approaches to Defming Terrorism

U.S. asylum law is inextricably tied to international law's
definitions of asylum via the Refugee Act,136 and it is significantly
influenced by international law's defmitions of terrorism via the U.N.
Protocol. 137 The Supreme Court has noted that a primary purpose of
the Refugee Act ''was to bring United States refugee law into
conformance with the [U.N. Protocol] to which the United States
129. See 22 U.S.c. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006); 18 U.S.c. § 2331(1)(B)(i)--(iii) (2006).
130. See Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2009); id at 786-88 (Nelson, 1.,
concurring).
131. Id at 787 (Nelson, 1., concurring); see also Donald R. Rothwell, Legal Opinion on the
Status of Non-Combatants and Contractors Under International Humanitarian Law
and Australian Law, AUSTL. STRATEGIC POL'y INSTIT. (Dec. 24,2004),
http://www.
aspi.org.au/pdf/ASPllegalopinion_ contractos.pdf
(stating
that
the
Geneva
Conventions makes important distinctions between combatants and non-combatants).
132. See Khan, 584 F.3d at 786-87.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
135. See Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal
Concept in International Law and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic
Legislation, 29 B.c. INT'L & CaMP. L. REv. 23,26, 102 (2006); infra text
accompanying notes 136-62.
136. See Meissner, supra note 25.
137. Khan, 584 F.3d at 786-88.
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acceded in 1968." 138 Yet this purpose is not fulfilled through Tier III,
which places the U.S. military and its democratic supporters in the
same category as the Taliban because both groups have used
"firearms and explosives" in their respective war efforts. 139
Arguably, the difference between the U.S. military's efforts in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the Taliban's campaigns are the purposes of
their actions and the forms of their targets. 140 Using this basis,
international law scholars have highlighted several factors to defme
the "faceless" undesignated terrorists in statutes like Tier III: the
terrorist's purpose and the terrorist's target. 141
Out of four common law jurisdictions-the United States, the
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia-the United States is the
only government that does not consider purpose as an element of
terrorist activity.142 What is terrorism's target? Many scholars
contend that terrorism targets noncombatants as well as combatants
through "deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing
of the irmocent to inspire fear for political ends.,,143 Additionally,
with terrorism, "violence is usually one-sided" and unarmed victims
not involved in the conflict "cannot, through surrender, save their
lives." 144
These intended targets of terrorism are unarmed victims. 145 They
are chosen randomly as "targets of opportunity" or selectively as
"symbolic targets" and "serve as message generators.,,146 These
138. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
139. See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V), 8 U.S.c. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V) (2006); Khan, 584
F.3d at 786-87; Kidane, supra note 63, at 321-22.
140. See Binyamin Netanyahu, Defining Terrorism, in TERRORISM: How THE WEST CAN
WIN 7, 9 (Binyamin Netanyahu ed., 1986) (explaining that what distinguishes
terrorism from conventional warfare is that terrorists intentionally select innocent
targets for the purpose of inspiring fear).
141. See Kidane, supra note 63, at 347-48 (discussing the definition of "terrorist act"
developed at the International Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention
of 1999).
142. Id. at 349 (noting that the hnmigration and Nationality Act does not include these
factors).
143. Netanyahu, supra note 140, at 9.
144. Rianne Letschert & Ines Staiger, Introduction and Definitions, in AsSISTING VICTIMS
OFTERRORISM: TOWARD A EUROPEAN STANDARD OF JUSTICE 14 (Rianne Letschert et
al. eds., 2010); see also Michael Stohl, Demystifying Terrorism: The Myths and
Realities of Contemporary Political Terrorism, in THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM 239
(Michael Stohl ed., 3rd ed. 1988) (comparing and contrasting freedom fighters who
target the military or government, and terrorists who target innocent civilians).
145. Letschert & Staiger, supra note 144, at 14.
146. Id.
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distinctions contrast with CNF, which engaged in armed resistance in
self-defense against a totalitarian regIme and not against
noncombatants. 147
The purpose of most terrorism is also specific. Terrorism usually
carries a politically ideological motive. 148
The International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (the
Convention), adopted by 171 state parties, is a primary source of
international law's consensus of a terrorist purpose. 149
The
Convention has been incorporated into the domestic immigration
laws of most states, including U.S. laws. 15o The Convention provides
that a person "commits an offense within the meaning of this
Convention" if that person, either "directly or indirectly, unlawfully
and willfully," intentionally or knowingly provides funds used in acts
causing "death or serious bodily injury" to noncombatants. 151
Further, the intention of terrorism is, "by its nature or context," to
physically threaten civilians or coerce the state or international body
to carry out the terrorist's whim. 152 Acts with no political agendas,
many scholars contend, are not terrorism but rather violent actions
that violate a particular country's laws. 153 While some argue that a
terrorist is the antithesis of a freedom fighter, this perspective falls
into many terrorists' "semantic trap[s],,,154 which justify terrorist
actions by calling them "liberation movements.,,155
Despite these semantic traps, however, the United States does not
view armed resistance as a legitimate purpose for armed conflict. 156
After ratifying the Convention, the United States objected to Jordan's
armed-struggle exception to the Convention. 157 The United States'
147. See S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 941-42 (B.I.A. 2006), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 24
I. & N. Dec. 475 (B.I.A. 2008).
148. Kidane, supra note 63, at 314.
149. Id. at 313-14.
150. Seeid. at313-15.
151. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, art. 2(1),
Dec. 9, 1999, T.I.A.S. No. 13075 [hereinafter The Convention].
152. Id.
153. See Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's
Freedom Fighter?, 3 POLICE PRAC. & REs. 287, 294 (2002).
154. Id. at 291-93.
155. Id.
156. See Kidane, supra note 63, at 349.
157. Id. at 315. Jordan also ratified the Convention, but stated that it did not consider
armed struggles against foreign occupation as terrorist acts within the context of the
Convention. Id. (quoting Status of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION 7 (Dec. 9,
1999), http://treaties.un.orgidoc/PublicationlMTDSGNolurne%20IUChaptet'1o
20XVIIIIXVII I-ll.en.pdf).
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objection to Jordan's exception "excludes any military operations by
nonstate actors even if their military operations are against legitimate
military objectives.,,158 This stance is puzzling, however, considering
that the United States has recognized Nelson Mandela's strategic
guerrilla warfare l59 and CNF's independence struggle as exceptions
to armed conflict because they are armed resistance movements. 160
All of these distinctions between terrorists and asylees help narrow
the Tier III classification to one that suggests terrorism is the
intentional or threatened use of violence against civilians with the
purpose of accomplishing a political agenda. 161 The three factors that
help clarify this defmition are (1) "[t]he essence of the activity [is]
the use of, or threat to use, violence"; (2) the activity's purpose is to
willfully achieve political changes; and (3) "[t]he targets of terrorism
are civilians.,,162
B.

A Multi-Factor Test: Drawing the Line between Terrorists,
Freedom Fighters, and Those Who Support Them

Tier III ignores the underpinning factors of democratic armed
resistance and the support of such efforts: who is the group targeting,
and why?163 This comment proposes that Congress amend Tier III to
establish a reasonable nexus between a terrorist purpose, a terrorist
target, and a terrorist activity. This individualized test defmes as
"undesignated terrorists" groups of two or more people, whether
organized or not, who (1) for the purpose of achieving a political
power-outcome or propaganda, (2) willingly exploit fear by
systematically or randomly targeting noncombatants, and (3) engage
in internationally proscribed violence, with the exclusion of certain

158. See id. at 349.
159. See Mimi Hall, Mandela Is on u.s. Terrorist Watch List, USA TODAY, May 1, 2008,
at 2a (noting the statement of past U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael
what
Chertoffthat the Mandela case "raises a troubling and difficult debate about
groups are considered terrorists and which are not"); Law Removes Mandela from
U.S. Watch List, WALL ST. J., July 2,2008, at A2.
160. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., RL
32564, IMMIGRATION: TERRORIST GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION AND REMOVAL OF ALIENS
6-7 (2010).
161. Ganor, supra note 153, at 294; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Policy-Oriented
Inquiry into the Different Forms and Manifestations of "International Terrorism," in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURALAsPECTS, at xv,
xxii-iii (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1988).
162. Ganor, supra note 153, at 294.
163. See id. at 293; Kidane, supra note 63, at 343-44, 366.
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politically dissenting activities. l64 The primary aim of this case-bycase determination is to ask whether an individual is an actual threat
to the United States. 165
1.

For the Purpose of Achieving a Political Power-Outcome or
Propaganda

The test's fIrst factor to consider is whether the group's purpose is
to push a political agenda. 166 A politically-oriented purpose to
achieve a power-outcome or propaganda is more specific than an aim
to express a politically dissenting opinion. 167 There are two parts to
this factor: (1) a politically-minded purpose, (2) to attain a poweroutcome or propaganda. 168
First, under the Convention, a terrorist group must conduct its
activities through purposeful action. 169 A group that unlawfully and
willfully, and intentionally or knowingly aims to coerce a
government or international organization to accomplish its own
politically-minded agenda 170 is a terrorist group.l7l This revised
defmition concentrates on the violent result to be achieved rather than
the political opinion to be expressed. 172
Second, a motive-oriented approach to defming terrorism must
also be based on whether the activity has a purpose to produce a
political power-outcome or propaganda. 173 Though some may argue
that a political purpose is too narrow of a criterion, it is effectively
expansive. 174 It is intentionally broad to include ideological or
religious aims that intend to effect some kind of violent change in
government, regime, or politics of society.175 Moreover, some
scholars suggest that specific motives are "empirical regularities
associated with terrorism" but are not necessary to defme what
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

17l.
172.

173.
174.
175.

See Bassiouni, supra note 161, at xxiii; Ganor, supra note 153, at 294-95.
See Kidane, supra note 63, at 367.
See Ganor, supra note 153, at 294.
Id.; Kidane, supra note 63, at 365.
See Bassiouni, supra note 161, at xiii.
See The Convention, supra note 151, at art. 2(1).
This approach, which classifies as terrorist supporters those who intended to further a
group's politically-minded purpose to produce a power-outcome or propaganda, is
also found in the Convention. See The Convention, supra note 151, at arts. (3)-(5).
Jd.
The U.S. Department of State also espouses the inclusion of a politically-minded
purpose to coerce government bodies as a qualification of a terrorist. See supra Part
IVA
See supra Part IV. A. 1.
See Ganor, supra note 153, at 294.
See id.
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terrorism is.176 Instead, many authorities agree that a terrorist is
motivated by a political aim to change the balance of power. 177
Despite the fact that in applying the ftrst factor there will be some
gray areas of determination, such as whether certain nonconventional guerrilla warfare qualiftes as terrorism or armed
confiict,178 requiring a defmition of terrorism to focus on a politicallyoriented purpose draws a clearer line of distinction than a sweeping,
generalized classiftcation like Tier III because it does not allow a
particular group to justify its means by the "worthiness" of its aims. 179
2.

Willingly and Strategically Exploit the Fear of Noncombatants

The second factor of the test is whether the particular group uses
its political agenda to willingly exploit the fear of noncombatants 180
through random or systematic strategies. 181 An aim of terrorism is to
take advantage of "the tremendous anxiety, and the intense media
reaction evoked by attacks against civilian targets.,,182 By defming
terrorism as a strategic attack against noncombatants rather than as
one merely based on subjective violence, ''we refute the slogan that
'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom ftghter. ",183
Relying on the ftrst factor's motivation to produce a political
power-outcome or agenda, the second factor specifies that terrorists
176. See Raymond D. Duvall & Michael Stohl, Governance by Terror, in POLITICS OF
TERRORISM, supra note 144, at 231,239.
177. See. e.g, Ganor, supra note 153, at 294.
178. See. e.g., Kidane, supra note 63, at 304-06, 364-65 (discussing the conflicts in
defining Nelson Mandela's guerrilla warfare against the apartheid regime as
terrorism). The U.S. Congress passed the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act,
urging South Africa to free Mandela, who had been convicted for treason, from
prison. "It would not be sensible to conclude that Congress
endangered the
security of the United States or that the alien supporters of Mandela in this country
were all deportable as terrorists endangering our national security." Id at 365; see
also Ganor, supra note 153, at 295-99 (discussing the distinctions between terrorism
and guerilla warfare).
179. See Ganor, supra note 153, at 288.
180. The U.S. Department of Defense defines noncombatants as civilians and military
personnel who are unarmed or who are not on duty at the time of the incident. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REpORTS ON TERRORISM 2010, at 242 (2011). A 2003
report also included military installations "when a state of military hostilities does not
exist at the site" in the definition of noncombatants. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2003, at xii n.l (2004).
181. See BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM (rev. & expanded ed. 2006).
182. See Ganor, supra note 153, at 295. The U.S. State Departmentand the U.S. Code also
include this aspect as a definition of a terrorist. See supra Part IV.A.1.
183. See Ganor, supra note 153, at 298.
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are ones who use "deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and
menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.,,184 Unlike
the use of force for self-defense and in most armed conflict or war
campaigns that target combatants, terrorist violence is usually onesided because the victims are generally unarmed. 185
3.

Engage in Internationally Proscribed Acts of Violence,
Excluding Acts of Political Dissent

The test's fmal factor determines if the group has engaged m
internationally proscribed acts of violence. 186 This defmition is
reasonable because those who apply for asylum are foreign nationals
who act under foreign laws. 187 However, the third factor creates
several challenges: (1) the issue of the ineffectually expansive IN A
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V); (2) the issue of self-defense as a terrorist
activity; and (3) the issue of classifying political dissent as a terrorist
activity. Each of these challenges is addressed and is overcome by
the reasonable parameters ofthe proposed third factor.

a.

Revising the effectiveness o/INA § 212(a) (3) (B) (iU) (V)

With the exception of section V, the activities identified as
terrorist activities under the INA violate international laws of warfare
or are international crimes against humanity. 188 Section V states that
causing physical injury to persons or damage to property with the use
of a dangerous device is a terrorist activity. 189 As previously
discussed, § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V) defmes war efforts and most armed
struggles as terrorist activities. 190
However, the fIrst two factors of the test serve to clarify what it
means to use a dangerous device to harm people or damage property
with a terrorist purpose and a terrorist target. 191 To use such force no
184. Netanyahu, supra note 140, at 9.
185. See Letschert & Staiger, supra note 144, at 14.
186. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
187.

188.

189.
190.
191.

LAW 765, 778.
This is recognized in INA § 212 (a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C § 1l82(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2006);
see also Kidane, supra note 57, at 677-78.
Compare INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (listing identified
terrorist activities), with Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (identifying acts
listed under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii) as ones that violate laws or customs of war and
crimes against humanity).
See INA § 212 (a)(3)(B)(iii)(V), 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V).
See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
See Ganor, supra note 153, at 288, 297-98; supra notes 166-85 and accompanying
text (explaining the first two factors of the individualized test).
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longer would include those who, like the SCNC, fought for their
independence from military regimes that violated human rights. 192
Rather, the third factor distinguishes these efforts from organizations
like the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which specifically
targeted civilians with the use of explosives to express a political
agenda and change the balance of power. 193

b.

Classifying self-defensive use of arms as a non-terrorist activity

The third factor also distinguishes those who use violence for selfdefense from those who use violence to accomplish illegitimate
aims. 194 Currently, the United States officially does not endorse the
idea of defming armed struggles that violate an oppressive regime's
laws as an exception to terrorism. 195 Yet in 1984, the U.S. Congress
urged the South African government to free Nelson Mandela, who
had been convicted of treason for his leadership of the anti-apartheid
movement,196 which was classified as armed conflict under
international law defmitions.197 This blatant discrepancy in U.S.
policies must be remedied by excluding self-defense from the
implications of INA § 2l2(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V). Otherwise, victims like
S-K-, who suffer grievous government human rights violations, like
ethnic genocide,198 will be unable to protect themselves against
oppressive regimes or receive protection in the U.S. 199
Unlike terrorism, self-defense is violence intended for selfpreservation rather than to perpetrate murder.2OO This caveat is
espoused by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Far East,
which notes that any international or domestic law that "prohibits
recourse to force, is necessarily limited to the right to selfdefence.,,201 Additionally, the U.N. Charter and the First Protocol to

192. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
193. See McMullen v. lNS, 788 F.2d 591,592-93,595-97 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled in
part by Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744 (9th Cir. 2005).
194. See Kidane, supra note 63, at 308.
195. Id. at 315.
196. See id. at 364-65.
197. See id. at 304,314,364-66.
198. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
199. See DeYoung, supra note 9.
200. See HUGO GROTlUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 76-77 (Ae. Campbell trans., M.
201.

Walter Dunne 1901) (1625)).
War and Neutrality, 15 ANN. DIG. & REp. PUB. INT'L L. CASES: YEAR 1948, at 356,
364 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1953); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND
SELF-DEFENSE 181 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 4th ed. 2005) (discussing how the
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the Geneva Conventions recognize the self-determinative right to
self-defense to resist racist oppression or alien occupation. 202
Excluding self-defense in the range of activities designated as
terrorism also clarifies what it means to "engage" in terrorist
activities under § 212(b)(3)(B)(iv).203 Many individuals who, for
example, "materially" supported groups using arms in self-defense 204
likely would not be barred from asylum because the revised
defmition would not designate the entities the asylum seekers
supported as Tier III terrorist organizations. 205
Classifying self-defensive armed conflict as conduct that is not a
terrorist activity is also consistent with the United Nation's
commitment to peace. 206 The U.N. Protocol provision was originally
meant to cover "war crimes, genocide and the subversion or
overthrow of democratic regimes,,207 aimed at government officials, 208
and was not intended to include armed resistance against totalitarian
regimes. 209 Although the issue of self-defense resistance where there
is no racial oppression or alien occupation is currently controversial
in international law,21O the exclusion of the right to self-defense
against regimes that violate international human rights as a terrorist
activity is a step in the right direction.
c.

Classifying acts ofpolitical dissent as non-terrorist activities

The fmal goal of the third factor is to distinguish between acts of
political dissent and acts of terrorism. 211 This requires the inclusion
of a specific list of activities that are not terrorist activities under Tier
III.212 Adapting a version similar to Australia's approach is useful.

202.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

exclusion of self-defense in the use of unlawful force is found in domestic and
international laws).
See U.N. Charter art. 51; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Conflict (Protocol
art.
I, ~ 4, Dec. 4,1979,1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv) (2006).
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See U.N. Charter art. I; Convention of Status of Refugees, supra note 31, at art. IF(c).
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184
(3d ed. 2007) (quoting U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons, Summary Rec. of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting, 2(a)(i), U.N.
Doc. AlCONF.2.SR24 (Nov. 27, 1951)).
See id. at 186-89.
See id. at 184.
See Kidane, supra note 63, at 310.
See Ganor, supra note 153, at 295-96; Kidane, supra note 63, at 310-11.
See Ganor, supra note 153, at 295-96; Kidane, supra note 63, at 310-11.
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Australia's approach views armed resistance and the support of such
efforts as legitimate within certain contexts. 213 It clearly states that
political dissent does not constitute support for terrorism. 214 An
action does not constitute a terrorist act if it:
(a) is advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action; and
(b) is not intended:
1.

11.
111.
IV.

to cause serious harm that is physical harm to
a person; or
to cause a person's death; or
to endanger the life of a person, other than
the person taking the action; or
to create a serious risk . . . .215

This addition clarifies what kinds of actions are terrorist activities
because it identifies what actions are not. 216 Under this revision,
peaceful political activism like Sara's support of the SCNC's
liberation movemenf17 is more clearly a pro-democratic expression
of political dissent, rather than support of a terrorist organization. 218
V. CONCLUSION
Statistics seem to indicate that the United States has continued its
international obligation set forth in the Refugee Act of 1980: it grants
asylum to foreign nationals from more than l05 countries each
year. 219 But this data belies the underlying danger in the current state
of U.S asylum in cases of pro-democratic groups and their
supporters.220
Because of the poorly constructed terrorist "safeguards" of Tier
III, the United States has made enemies out of its allies. Tier III bars
from asylum persons like the aforementioned Sara; individuals who
were part of Afghan mujahidin groups that, with U.S. support, fought
the Soviet invasion in the 1980s; and members of the main
democratic opposition party in Zimbabwe, the Movement for
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

See Kidane, supra note 63, at 365.
Id.
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 100.1 (Austl.).
Jd.
See supra notes 1-3.
See Kidane, supra note 63, at 365-66.
See Meissner, supra note 25.
See Dwoskin, supra note 15, at 2.
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Democratic Change, whose leader, the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe,
was praised by President Obama for his "courage and tenacity" in
handling Zimbabwe's political unrest.22! These outcomes of the Tier
III bar indicate that the United States has overcompensated in its
response to national security concerns raised after 9/11.222
An ineffectual and inconsistent response like the Tier III
classification does not resolve these challenges. The solution must
not be, as is the current cause of the problem, to burden the
overstrained DHS with discretionary waivers conferred at the whim
of the Attorney General. 223 Instead, the solution should be to amend
Tier III to include a multi-factor test that focuses on a reasonable
nexus between a terrorist activity, a terrorist purpose, and a terrorist
target. 224
The challenges of pinpointing an international defmition for
terrorism and of distinguishing the use of force in self-defense and in
terrorism, though complicated, are not excuses to classify as terrorists
those who aid the United States and advocate democracy. The multifactor test does not resolve all the problems of defming terrorism, but
it does provide a more effective reasonable basis to distinguish a
member or supporter ofa pro-democratic group from a terrorist. 225
A multi-factor test as an amendment to the Tier III classification is
the best solution for administrative delays226 and for the ineffective
and inconsistent classifications of "undesignated terrorists" of U.S.
Finally, the proposed
allies who are eligible for asylum. 227
individualized test furthers the Refugee Act's true purpose: 228 To
protect the persecuted and keep out the terrorists.
Daniella Pozzo Darnellt

221. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 91, at 4-5.
222. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jennifer Hojaiban, International Migration and AntiTerrorism Laws and Policies: Balancing Security and Refugee Protection,
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MIGRATION, 1-3 (Feb. 2008), available at http://wwwI2.georgetown.edulsfs/isiml
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223. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 91, at 1-2, 44.
224. See supra Part IV.B.
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226. See supra Part H.A.
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